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Abstract
Consider a set of voters V , represented by a multiset in a metric space (X, d). The voters have
to reach a decision - a point in X. A choice p ∈ X is called a β-plurality point for V , if for any
other choice q ∈ X it holds that {v ∈ V | β · d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v)} ≥ |V |2 . In other words, at least half
of the voters “prefer” p over q, when an extra factor of β is taken in favor of p.
Define β∗(X,d) = sup{β | every finite multiset V in X admits a β-plurality point}. Aronov, de
Berg, Gudmundsson, and Horton [SoCG 2020], showed that for the Euclidean plane β∗(R2,‖·‖2) =
√
3
2 ,
and more generally, for d-dimensional Euclidean space, 1√
d
≤ β∗(Rd,‖·‖2) ≤
√
3
2 . In this paper, we
show that 0.557 ≤ β∗(Rd,‖·‖2) for any dimension d (notice that 1√d < 0.557 for any d ≥ 4). In
addition, we prove that for every metric space (X, d) it holds that
√
2− 1 ≤ β∗(X,d), and show that
there exist a metric space for which β∗(X,d) ≤ 12 .
1 Introduction
Consider a metric space (X, d), and a finite multiset of points V from X, called voters. We think
of each point p ∈ X as a potential choice, where a voter v prefers a choice p ∈ X over a choice
q ∈ X if d(p, v) < d(q, v). The goal is to find a consensus. Specifically, a choice point p ∈ X is a
plurality point if for any other choice point q ∈ X, more voters prefer p over q than vice-versa, i.e.,
|{v ∈ V | d(p, v) < d(q, v)}| ≥ |{v ∈ V | d(p, v) > d(q, v)}|. The special case where (X, d) = (Rd, ‖ · ‖2)
is called spatial voting games, and was studied in the political economy context [Bla48, Dow57, Plo67,
EH83]. When X = R is the real line, a plurality point always exist, in fact, it is simply the median of
V . When (X, d) is induced by the shortest path metric of a tree graph, then a plurality point exist as
well. 1 However, already in R2 a plurality point does not always exist, see [WLWC13, dBGM18] for
algorithms that determine whether such a point exist.
Recently, Aronov, de Berg, Gudmundsson, and Horton [AdBGH20], introduced a relaxation, by
defining a point p ∈ X to be a β-plurality point, for β ∈ (0, 1], if for every other point q ∈ X,
|{v ∈ V | β · d(p, v) < d(q, v)}| ≥ |{v ∈ V | β · d(p, v) > d(q, v)}|. In other words, if we scale distances
towards p by a factor of β, then for every choice point q, there are more voters preferring p over q
than voters preferring q over p. Set β(X,d)(p, V ) := sup{β | p is a β-plurality point in X w.r.t. V },
β(X,d)(V ) = supp∈X β(p, V ), and β∗(X,d) = inf{β(X,d)(V ) | V is a multiset in X}. A natural question is
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1If T is the tree inducing (X, d), then the plurality point will be the separator vertex z ∈ X, the removal of which
will break the graph T \ {z} into connected components, each containing at most |V |
2
voter points.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
04
79
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
G]
  1
0 M
ay
 20
20
Space Lower Bound Upper Bound Ref
R and tree metric 1 1
(R2, ‖ · ‖2)
√
3/2 ≈ 0.866 √3/2 [AdBGH20]
(R3, ‖ · ‖2) 1/√3 ≈ 0.577
√
3/2 [AdBGH20]
(Rd, ‖ · ‖2) for d ≥ 4 ≈ 0.557
√
3/2 Theorem 3, [AdBGH20]
General metric space
√
2− 1 ≈ 0.414 1/2 Theorem 1, Theorem 2
Table 1: Summery of current and previous results on β∗X for different metric spaces.
to find or estimate these parameters. We refer to [AdBGH20] for further motivation, and a review of
the (considerable) related literature.
Aronov et al. [AdBGH20] studied the case of Euclidean space, i.e. (Rd, ‖ · ‖2). Given a specific
instance V , they presented an EPTAS to approximate β(Rd,‖·‖2)(V ). For the case of the Euclidean
plane (d = 2), they showed that β∗(R2,‖·‖2) =
√
3
2 . Specifically, they showed that for every multiset
of voters V in R2, there exists a point p ∈ R2 such that β(R2,‖·‖2)(V, p) ≥
√
3
2 . Furthermore, they
showed that for the case where V consist of the three vertices of an equilateral triangle, it holds that
β(R2,‖·‖2)(V ) ≤
√
3
2 . For the general d-dimensional Euclidean space (R
d, ‖ · ‖2), Aronov et al. showed a
lower bound of β∗(V ) ≥ 1√
d
. Aronov et al. left (as a “main open problem”) closing the gap between
1√
d
and
√
3
2 . In addition, they asked what bound on β
∗ could be proved in other metric spaces.
Our contribution. We prove that for every metric space (X, d), β∗X,d ≥
√
2 − 1. In addition, we
present a specific instance of a (non Euclidean) metric space (X, d), were β∗(X,d) =
1
2 . Finally, for the
case of Euclidean space of arbitrary dimension d, we show that β∗Rd,‖·‖2 ≥ 0.557. Note that this lower
bound is larger than 1√
d
for d ≥ 4. All the current and previous results are summarized in Table 1.
2 General Metric Spaces
We begin by providing an alternative definition of β-plurality point.
Definition 1. Consider a metric space (X, d), and a multiset V in X of voters. A point p ∈ X is a
β-plurality point if for every q ∈ X, |{v ∈ V | β · d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v)}| ≥ |V |2 .
In addition, similarly to [AdBGH20], set β(X,d)(V ) = supp∈X β(p, V ) and β∗(X,d) = inf{β(X,d)(V ) |
V is a multiset in X}.
The difference between the definitions is that in Definition 1, a voter v that is “undecided”, i.e.,
β·d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v), will choose p over q, while in the original definition, such voters remain “undecided”.
Definition 1 is equivalent to the original definition in [AdBGH20]. A proof of this equivalence appears
in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. For every metric space (X, d), β∗(X,d) ≥
√
2− 1.
Proof. Consider a metric space (X, d), with a multiset V of voters from X, and set |V | = n. For
a point p and radius r, denote by BV (p, r) = {v ∈ V | d(p, v) ≤ r} the (multi) subset of voters at
distance at most r from p (i.e. those that are contained in the closed ball of radius r centered at p),
and let Rp be the minimum radius such that |BV (p,Rp)| ≥ n2 .
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Let p∗ ∈ X be the point with minimum Rp over all p ∈ X, and denote Bp∗ = BV (p∗, Rp∗). We claim
that p∗ is a (
√
2− 1)-plurality point.
Set β =
√
2 − 1, and notice that β = 12+β . Consider some choice point q ∈ X, and set d(p∗, q) =
(1 + α) ·Rp∗ , for α ≥ −1. Let B˚q = {v ∈ V | d(q, v) < Rq} be the (multi) subset of voters at distance
(strictly) smaller than Rq from q (i.e. those that are contained in the open ball of radius Rq centered
at q). Consider the following cases:
• α ≤ β: For every point v /∈ B˚q, as d(q, v) ≥ Rq ≥ Rp∗ , by the triangle inequality it holds that
d(p∗, v) ≤ d(p∗, q) + d(q, v) ≤ (2 + α) · d(q, v) ≤ (2 + β) · d(q, v) = 1
β
· d(q, v) .
• α ≥ β: For every point v ∈ Bp∗ , as d(p∗, q) = (1 + α) ·Rp∗ ≥ (1 + α) · d(p∗, v), it holds that
d(q, v) ≥ d(q, p∗)− d(p∗, v) ≥ (1 + α− 1) · d(p∗, v) ≥ β · d(p∗, v) .
The theorem follows as |B˚q| < n2 ≤ |Bp∗ |.
Theorem 2. There is a metric space (X, d) such that β∗(X,d) =
1
2 .
Proof. Consider the cycle graph C3 with 3 vertices {v1, v2, v3}, where all the edge lengths are 2. We
think of the edges of C3 as intervals (or one dimensional segments) of length 2, glued at the vertices,
and the distance between two points on C3 is the geodesic path dg, i.e., it is the shortest path between
them, restricted to walking only on the edges (segments) of C3 (for a more formal definition, see for
example [RR98]).
v2
v3v1
p
q
α
1− α2
Let V = {v1, v2, v3} be the voter set. We claim that for every choice p ∈ C3,
β(p, V ) = 12 , which will imply the theorem. Assume w.l.o.g. that p lies on
the edge {v1, v2}, at distance α ∈ [0, 1] from v1 (see the figure to the right for
illustration).
We first show that β(p, V ) ≤ 12 . Assume by contradiction that p is a β-plurality
point for β > 12 , and consider a choice point q lying on the edge {v2, v3} at
distance 1− α2 from v2. Then β · dg(p, v2) = β · (2− α) > 1− α2 = dg(q, v2) and
β · dg(p, v3) = β · (2 +α) > 1 + α2 = dg(q, v3), which contradicts the assumption
that p is a β-plurality point.
v2
v3v1
p
α
1− α2
1 + α2
α
2
Next, we argue that p is a 12 -plurality point. The voter v1 will prefer a choice
point q over p if and only if q lies at distance strictly smaller than α2 from v1.
Similarly, to win v2 (resp. v3) q must be at distance strictly smaller than 1− α2
(resp. 1 + α2 ) from v2 (resp. v3). See illustration on the right. As those three
intervals are disjoint, we conclude that at least two voters prefer p over any
other choice point q, and the theorem follows.
3 Euclidean Space
In this section we consider the case of the Euclidean metric space, and give a bound on β∗
(Rd,‖·‖2) which
is independent of d and greater than 1√
d
for any d ≥ 4, thus improving the lower bound of [AdBGH20]
for d ≥ 4.
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Theorem 3. For Euclidean space of arbitrary dimension, β∗
(Rd,‖·‖2) ≥ β,
for β = 12
√
1
2 +
√
3− 12
√
4
√
3− 3 ≈ 0.55701571813579904605525266098621644838064149582041992
We begin with a structural observation regarding the Euclidean space.
Claim 1. Fix a pair of candidates ~a,~b ∈ Rd. The set of all voters ~v ∈ V that do not β-prefer ~a over ~b,
i.e.
{
~v ∈ V | β · ‖~a− ~v‖2 > ‖~b− ~v‖2
}
, is contained in the open ball centered at ~o = ~a+ 1
1−β2 · (~b−~a)
with radius β · ‖~o− ~a‖2.
Proof. By translation and rotation, we can assume w.l.o.g. that ~a = ~0, and ~b = ‖~a−~b‖2 · e1 (e1 here
is the first standard basis vector). A straightforward calculation shows that
{
~x ∈ Rd | β · ‖~a− ~x‖2 > ‖~b− ~x‖2
}
=
{
~x ∈ Rd |
(
x1 − ‖~a−~b‖2
)2
+
d∑
i=2
x2i < β
2 ·
d∑
i=1
x2i
}
=
~x ∈ Rd |
(
x1 − ‖~a−
~b‖2
1− β2
)2
+
d∑
i=2
x2i <
β2‖~a−~b‖22
(1− β2)2
 .
Thus we indeed obtain a ball with center at ~o = ‖~a−
~b‖2
1−β2 · e1 = ~a + 11−β2 · (~a − ~b), and radius r =√
β2‖~a−~b‖22
(1−β2)2 = β · ‖~o− ~a‖2.
By the above claim we can conclude:
Corollary 1. ~a is a β-plurality point if and only if, for every other point ~o ∈ Rd, the open ball of
radius β · ‖~o− ~a‖2 around ~o contains at most n2 voters.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a multiset V ⊆ Rd of voters. Using the notation from the proof of
Theorem 1, let ~p be the point that minimizes R~p. By scaling, we can assume without loss of generality
that R~p = 1. If ~p is a β-plurality point, then we are done. Otherwise, by Corollary 1 there is a point ~q
such that the open ball BRd (~q, β · ‖~p− ~q‖2) contains strictly more than n2 voters. Denote q = ‖~p−~q‖2.
Set ~w = ~p+
(
1
2(1− β2)q − β + 32q
)
~q−~p
‖~q−~p‖2 , we claim that ~w is a β-plurality point.
First, notice that q > 1β , as otherwise the open ball of radius βq ≤ 1 around ~q contains more than
n
2 voters, a contradiction to the fact that R~p = 1 is the minimal radius of a closed ball containing at
least n2 voters. Second, it must hold that q <
1
1−β , because otherwise βq + 1 ≤ q, implying that the
ball BRd(~p,R~p) and the open ball BRd(~q, βq) are disjoint, a contradiction to the fact that the open
ball BRd(~q, βq) contains more than
n
2 voters. Therefore, we conclude that
1
β
< q <
1
1− β (3.1)
Notice that ~p is a 12 -plurality point, because no q satisfies equation (3.1).
To prove that ~w is a β-plurality point, we will show that for every other point ~z ∈ Rd, the open ball
of radius β · ‖~z − ~w‖2 around ~z contains at most n2 voters. We will use the following lemma.
4
~p ~q1
β
1
1−β
1
βq
~w
~i
1
1
1
√
4− w2Bp
Bq
Figure 1: The points ~p = (0, 0), ~q = (q, 0), and ~w = (w, 0) for w = 12(1 − β2)q − β + 32q are on the
x-axis. Bp is the circle of radius 2 around ~p, while Bq is the circle of radius 1 + βq around ~q. Bp and
Bq intersect at ~i = (w,
√
4− w2) and ~i′ = (w,−√4− w2). The ball of radius 1 around ~i is tangent to
both Bp and Bq. It holds that ‖~w −~i‖2 =
√
4− w2 ≤ 1β (equation (3.2)).
Lemma 1. For any point ~z ∈ Rd, denote z = ‖~z − ~w‖2. Then at least one of the following hold:
1. z ≤ 1β .
2. ‖~z − ~p‖2 ≥ 1 + βz.
3. ‖~z − ~q‖2 ≥ βq + βz.
Before proving Lemma 1, we show how it implies that ~w is a β-plurality point. For any ~z ∈ Rd:
• If z ≤ 1β , then βz ≤ 1 = R~p, and thus BRd(~z, βz) contains at most n2 voters.
• If ‖~z − ~p‖2 ≥ 1 + βz, then the balls BRd(~p, 1) and BRd(~z, βz) are disjoint, and thus BRd(~z, zβ)
contains at most n2 voters.
• If ‖~z − ~q‖2 ≥ βq + βz, then the balls BRd(~q, βq) and BRd(~z, βz) are disjoint, and thus BRd(~z, z)
contains at most n2 voters.
We conclude that for every ~z ∈ Rd, BRd(~z, z) contains at most n2 voters, and thus by Corollary 1, ~w
is a β-plurality point.
Proof of Lemma 1. The points ~p, ~q, ~w lie on a single line. Given an additional point ~z, the four points
lie on a single plane. Thus, without loss of generality, we can restrict the analysis to the Euclidean
plane. Moreover, we can assume that ~p = (0, 0), ~q = (q, 0), ~w = (w, 0) for w = 12(1 − β2)q − β + 32q ,
and that ~z = (zx, zy) where zy ≥ 0 (the case of zy ≤ 0 is symmetric).
Denote Bp = BR2(~p, 2) and Bq = BR2(~q, 1+βq) (see Figure 1). The boundaries of Bp and Bq intersect
at the points (w,±√4− w2) (this is the reason for our choice of w). Denote ~i = (w,√4− w2), and
notice that 0 < w < q for any q ≥ 1β (this can be verified by straightforward calculations). Lemma 1
follows by the two following claims:
Claim 2. If ~z ∈ Bp ∩Bq then ‖~z − ~w‖2 ≤ 1β .
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Claim 3. If ~z /∈ Bp ∩Bq then either ‖~z − ~p‖2 ≥ 1 + βz or ‖~z − ~q‖2 ≥ βq + βz.
Proof of Claim 2. The boundaries of Bp and Bq intersect at the points ~i = (w,
√
4− w2) and
~i′ = (w,−√4− w2). For every q ∈ ( 1β , 11−β ), it holds that
‖~i− ~w‖2 =
√
4− w2 ≤ 1
β
. (3.2)
In fact, β was chosen to be the maximum number satisfying equation (3.2). A calculation showing
that equation (3.2) holds is deferred to Appendix B. Consider the ball Bw = BR2(~w, ‖~i − ~w‖2). Bw
has radius at most 1β , and the segment [
~i, ~i′] is a diameter of Bw. Furthermore, [~i, ~i′] is a chord in
both Bp and Bq.
BqBp
~i
~p ~w ~q
~i′
~z
Assume that ~z = (zx, zy) ∈ Bp ∩ Bq. If zx ≥ w, then the chord [~i, ~i′]
of Bp separates the point ~z from the center ~p, because 0 < w < q (see
illustration on the right). It follows that the angle ∠~i~z~i′ is larger than
pi
2 , which implies that ~z ∈ Bw (as [~i, ~i′] is a diameter, for any point
~z /∈ Bw, the angle ∠~i~z~i′ is smaller than pi2 ). If the zx < w, a symmetric
argument (using Bq) will imply that ~z ∈ Bw. We conclude that in any
case ~z ∈ Bw. By equation (3.2), it follows that ‖~z − ~w‖2 ≤ 1β .
Proof of Claim 3. Assume that ~z = (zx, zy) /∈ Bp∩Bq. We show that if zx ≥ w then ‖~z−~p‖2 ≥ 1+βz,
and otherwise ‖~z − ~q‖2 ≥ βq + βz.
First, consider the case when zx ≥ w. Notice that ~z /∈ Bp, because the boundaries of Bp and Bq
intersect only at ~i, ~i′, and thus the intersection of Bp with the half plane x ≥ w is contained in Bq.
Let ~z′ = (z′x, z′y) be a point on the ball with radius ‖~z − ~p‖2 around ~p such that z′x = w and z′y ≥ 0,
and notice that z′y ≥ zy (see illustration on the right). Notice that ‖~z′ − ~w‖2 ≥ ‖~z − ~w‖2, because
z2x + z
2
y = ‖~z − ~p‖22 = ‖~z′ − ~p‖22 = w2 + z′y2 and zx ≥ w, so we get ‖~z − ~w‖22 = z2y + (zx − w)2 =
z2y + z
2
x − 2wzx + w2 = 2w2 − 2wzx + z′y2 ≤ z′y2 = ‖~z′ − ~w‖22.
~p ~w
~z
~z′
‖~p− ~z‖2
Since ‖~z − ~p‖2 = ‖~z′ − ~p‖2, it is enough to show that ‖~z′ − ~p‖2 ≥
1 + β‖~z′ − ~w‖2. From here on, we will abuse notation and refer to z′ as
z. Thus we simply assume ~z = (w, z).
As Bp and Bq intersect at ~i, and ~z /∈ Bp ∩ Bq, it must hold that z ≥√
4− w2. Note that ‖~p−~i‖2 = 2 (because ~i is on the boundary of Bp),
and by equation (3.2), β·‖~i− ~w‖2 ≤ 1. It thus follows that 1+β‖~w−~i‖2 ≤
2 = ‖~p−~i‖2, implying that the claim holds for ~z =~i. It remains to prove
that the claim holds for ~z = (w,
√
4− w2 + δ) for all δ ≥ 0. It holds that
‖~z − ~p‖22 = w2 + (
√
4− w2 + δ)2 = ‖~i− ~p‖22 + 2δ
√
4− w2 + δ2 .
(1 + β · ‖~z − ~w‖2)2 =
(
1 + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2 + β · ‖~z −~i‖2
)2
=
(
1 + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2
)2
+ 2β‖~z −~i‖2
(
1 + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2
)
+ β2‖~z −~i‖22
=
(
1 + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2
)2
+ 2βδ
(
1 + β
√
4− w2
)
+ β2δ2 .
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As 1 + β‖~w −~i‖2 ≤ ‖~p−~i‖2, it holds that
‖~z − ~p‖22 − (1 + β · ‖~z − ~w‖2)2 ≥
(
2δ
√
4− w2 + δ2
)
−
(
2βδ
(
1 + β
√
4− w2
)
+ β2δ2
)
= 2δ
√
4− w2 (1− β2)+ δ2(1− β2)− 2βδ ≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds 2 as by our choice of β,
√
4− w2 (1− β2) ≥ β for every 1β < q < 11−β .
The claim follows.
Next, we show that in the symmetric case, when zx ≤ w, it holds that ‖~z − ~q‖2 ≥ βq + βz. Similarly
to the previous case, we can assume that ~z = (w, z), where z ≥ √4− w2 (as this is only harder). Now,
as ~i lies on the boundary of Bq, by equation (3.2), it holds that ‖~i− ~q‖2 = 1 + βq ≥ β‖~w −~i‖2 + βq.
It remains to prove that the claim holds for ~z = (w,
√
4− w2 + δ) for some δ > 0. It holds that
‖~z − ~q‖22 = (q − w)2 + (
√
4− w2 + δ)2 = ‖~i− ~q‖22 + 2δ
√
4− w2 + δ2 .
(βq + β · ‖~z − ~w‖2)2 =
(
βq + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2 + β · ‖~z −~i‖2
)2
=
(
βq + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2
)2
+ 2β‖~z −~i‖2
(
βq + β · ‖~i− ~w‖2
)
+ β2‖~z −~i‖22
≥
(
βq + β‖~i− ~w‖2
)2
+ 2βδ
(
βq + β
√
4− w2
)
+ β2δ2 .
Thus,
‖~z − ~q‖22 − (βq + β · ‖~z − ~w‖2)2 ≥
(
2δ
√
4− w2 + δ2
)
−
(
2βδ
(
βq + β
√
4− w2
)
+ β2δ2
)
= 2δ
√
4− w2 (1− β2)+ δ2(1− β2)− 2β2qδ ≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality holds 3 as by our choice of β,
√
4− w2 (1− β2) ≥ β2q for every 1β < q < 11−β .
The claim follows.
~p ~q
Bp
Bq
~w
~z
~w2
BzRemark 1. A natural extension of the algorithm in Theorem 3
will be to allow another step. Specifically, to choose β′ > β so
that Lemma 1 will not hold w.r.t. β′. Then, in case ~w is
not a β′-plurality point, there is a point ~z such that the ball
BRd(~z, β
′‖~z − ~w‖2) contains more than n2 voter points. Then,
one might hope to find a new candidate point ~w2 that will be
a β′-plurality point. Here a natural choice of ~w2 will be the
center of the minimal ball containing the intersection of the
three balls Bp = BRd(~p, 2), Bq = BRd(~q, β
′‖~q − ~p‖2 + 1), and
Bz = BRd(~z, β
′‖~z − ~w‖2 + 1). See illustration on the right.
Even though it is indeed possible that this approach will provide some improvement, it is unlikely to
be significant. The reason is that even for the simplest symmetric case where ~q = ( 1β′ , 0), ~z = (
1
2β′ ,
1
β′ ),
one need β′ ≤
√
89
256 ≈ 0.59. For the hardest case, it is likely that a much smaller β′ will be required.
4 Conclusion
Denote β∗ = inf
{
β∗(X,d) | (X, d) is a metric space
}
. In this paper we showed that
√
2 − 1 ≤ β∗ ≤
1
2 . Further, in the Euclidean case, for arbitrary dimension d ≥ 4, by combining our results with
2See calculation here.
3See calculation here.
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[AdBGH20], we know that 0.557 < β∗
(Rd,‖·‖2) ≤
√
3
2 . The main question left open is closing these two
gaps. Our conjecture is that the upper bounds are tight, this is due to the fact that when |V | = 3, a
plurality point must “win” 23 of the overall vote. This task supposedly become only easier once the
number of voters increase.
Conjecture 1. β∗ = 12 , and β
∗
(Rd,‖·‖2) =
√
3
2 for every d ≥ 2.
Acknowledgments. After sharing our proof of Theorem 1 with the authors of [AdBGH20], Mark
de Berg proved a weaker version of Theorem 3, and generously allowed us to publish our proof which
is based on his observation. Specifically, de Berg proved that β∗
(Rd,‖·‖2) ≥
1
2 .
4
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A Equivalence between the definitions of β-plurality point
Lemma 2. Definition 1 for β(p, V ) is equivalent to the definition from Aronov et al. [AdBGH20].
Proof. We will use β(p, V ) to denote the definition given in [AdBGH20] (and in our introduction), and
β˜(p, V ) to denote our definition from Definition 1. We will show that for every metric space (X, d),
voter multiset V in X and point p ∈ X, it holds that β(p, V ) = β˜(p, V ). The equivalence between the
other parameters will follow. Fix |V | = n. There are two directions for the proof:
4Following the lines of the proof of Theorem 3, for β = 1
2
, ~p is a 1
2
-plurality point, as no q satisfying equation (3.1).
8
• β(p, V ) ≤ β˜(p, V ). Assume by contradiction that β˜(p, V ) < β(p, V ). By the definition of β(p, V ),
there exists α, β˜(p, V ) < α ≤ β(p, V ) such that for every q ∈ X, |{v ∈ V | α · d(p, v) < (q, v)}| ≥
|{v ∈ V | α · d(p, v) > d(q, v)}|, implying |{v | α · d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v)}| ≥ n2 . Thus β˜(p, V ) ≥ α, a
contradiction.
• β˜(p, V ) ≤ β(p, V ). Assume by contradiction that β(p, V ) < β˜(p, V ), and let  > 0 such
that β(p, V ) +  < β˜(p, V ). By definition of β˜(p, V ), there is an α ≥ β(p, V ) +  such
that for every q, |{v ∈ V | α · d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v)}| ≥ n2 . Let α′ = α − 2 ∈ (β(p, V ), α). Then
for every q 6= p, |{v ∈ V | α′ · d(p, v) < (q, v)}| ≥ |{v ∈ V | α · d(p, v) ≤ d(q, v)}| ≥ n2 , im-
plying |{v ∈ V | α′ · d(p, v) < d(q, v)}| ≥ |{v ∈ V | α′ · d(p, v) > d(q, v)}|. Clearly, for q = p,
|{v ∈ V | α′ · d(p, v) < d(q, v)}| ≥ |{v ∈ V | α′ · d(p, v) > d(q, v)}|. It follows that p is an α′-
plurality point, a contradiction.
B Proof of equation (3.2)
Set f(β, q) = ‖~i − ~w‖22 = 4 − w2 = 4 −
(
1
2(1− β2)q − β + 32q
)2
. We will show that for our choice of
β, ∀q ∈ ( 1β , 11−β ), it holds that
√
f(β, q) ≤ 1β , thus proving equation (3.2).
∂
∂q
f(β, q) = 2
(
1
2
(1− β2)q − β + 3
2q
)(
1
2
(1− β2)− 3
2q2
)
which equals to 0 only for q ∈
{
±
√
3
1−β2 ,
√
4β2−3±β
β2−1
}
. 5
As we restrict our attention to q ∈ ( 1β , 11−β ), it follows that once we fixed β, f(β, q) has a maximum
at
√
3
1−β2 (note that
√
3
1−β2 ∈ (1b , 11−b) for every b ∈ (12 , 1)). It thus will be enough to prove that
f(β, q) ≤ f
(
β,
√
3
1− β2
)
= 1 + 2β2 + 2
√
3
√
1− β2β ≤ 1
β2
.
This expression could be “massaged” into a degree 4 polynomial. Thus we can obtain an exact solution.
In particular, for every β ∈
(
0, 12
√
1
2 +
√
3− 12
√
4
√
3− 3
]
≈ (0, 0.557], 6 it holds that √f(β, q) ≤ 1β ,
as required.
5See calculation here.
6See calculation here.
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